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ARTICLE
THE RIGHT OF MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES TO REFER THEIR "LOCAL"




The United Nations Charter recognizes the existence of regional ar-
rangements or agencies, such as the Organization of American States
(OAS), the Organization of African Unity, and the League of Arab
States.1 The Charter clearly indicates that these agencies must be
"consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations'" 2
and that, in matters of peace and security, the regional agencies are to
be considered subordinate to the United Nations Security Council.'
The OAS Charter declares that the OAS is a regional agency within
the United Nations.4 Listing the essential purposes of the OAS, the
Charter states the OAS was established "to put into practice the prin-
ciples on which it [the OAS] is founded and to fulfill its regional obli-
gations under the [United Nations] Charter."0 The OAS Charter fur-
ther states that none of its provisions "shall be construed as impairing
the rights and obligations of the Member States under the Charter of
the United Nations."'
* J.D. (Buenos Aires); M.C.L. (Georgetown University Law Center); Ph.D. (Uni-
versity of Cambridge, England). Principal Legal Advisor, General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States and Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington College
of Law, The American University. The views expressed by the author of this article are
solely his own.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. OAS CHARTER art. 1.
5. 5. Id. art. 2.
6. Id. art. 137.
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The interpretation and application by the OAS of several provisions
concerning the role and scope of competence of regional arrangements
has created certain conflicts between the universal and the regional or-
ganizations. Forty years after the approval of the OAS Charter, these
conflicts have not yet been completely resolved.
This Article examines the practice of the members of the OAS, par-
ticularly the evolving practice of recent years, regarding the issue of
OAS jurisdiction vis-A-vis the United Nations in the settlement of in-
traregional disputes. Analysis of specific cases will demonstrate that in
certain respects, political realities of the postwar era rather than rules
and principles which normally guide the interpretation of legal instru-
ments are the major source of this complicated question.'
Two central issues that have given rise to conflicts between the OAS
and the United Nations relate to the fundamental question of "prior-
ity" of jurisdiction in the settlement of intraregional disputes and to the
"enforcement action" authorized by the OAS. As Professor Franck
pointed out, "[a]rticles 52 and 53 of the United Nations Charter have
been interpreted to legitimize the use of force by regional organizations
in their collective self-interest and, specifically, the role and primacy of
regional organizations in settling disputes between their members."8
The issue of the competence of regional agencies to establish a multi-
lateral peacekeeping force is a third issue of competence which also has
far-reaching implications for the relationship between the United Na-
tions and regional arrangements or agencies.
The first issue, that of priority, relates to the availability of a suitable
forum. At issue is competence, which in turn raises the question of the
relative priority, if any, to be given to regional organizations such as
the OAS as against the Security Council to promote the settlement of
intraregional disputes. To put it another way, do members of the
United Nations that are also members of regional organizations have
the right to insist on action by the United Nations in a dispute, or in a
situation that "might lead to international friction," or should they pre-
sent the case to a regional organization for prior consideration? On
various occasions, a number of OAS members, invoking article 23 of
7. Cf. I. CLAUDE JR., POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 194-95 (1962)
(describing the East-West polarization of the post-war world); Claude, The OAS, the
UN, and the United States, 547 INT'L CONCILIATION 1, 21-46 (1964) (analyzing the
conflict of jurisdiction between the OAS and the United Nations Security Council);
Bowett, Interrelacibn de Estados Americanos y las Naciones Unidas dentro del Marco
de la Seguridad Colectiva, 15 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MEXICO
860, 861 (1965) (discussing the interplay between the OAS and the United Nations
Security Council in the area of collective security).
8. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 822 (1970).
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the Charter of the OAS,9 article 2 of the Rio Treaty10 and article II of
the Pact of -Bogotd," have argued that the Inter-American procedures
for pacific settlement of disputes take priority over the United Nations
procedures. In other words, when a "local" dispute develops between
member states of the OAS, those states must resort to the regional
procedures before going to the United Nations. 2 A similar type of con-
flict has occurred when some American states have attempted to take
"local" 3 disputes to the Security Council after the OAS had already
begun to deal with the case. A further complication has occurred in the
Malvinas conflict of 1982 and, to a certain degree, in the Nicaraguan
situation of 1983, when the OAS decided to exercise jurisdiction after
the Security Council was already seized of the matter.
The issue of the competence of the United Nations and of regional
arrangements. regarding the settlement of international disputes has yet
another dimension. Namely, whether the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) is precluded from adjudicating legal disputes related to matters
that are also being considered by the Security Council or regional
agencies, or both. Several cases brought before the Court prior to 1984
raised this issue, but it was dealt with in greater detail by the respec-
tive Parties and by the ICJ in the Nicaraguan Case. 4
The second issue relates to the definition, and indeed the application
by the OAS, of "enforcement action" as set forth in article 52 of the
9. OAS CHARTER art. 23.
10. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 2, 62 Stat.
1681, 1682, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 80 [hereinafter Rio Treaty].
11. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes, art. II, 17 OASTS 15, 15,
OAS Doc. OEA/ser. A/3/SEPF. (1961) [hereinafter Pact of Bogotd]; see also 1 GEN-
ERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, THE INTER-AMiERI-
CAN SYSTEM 212-59 (1983) (describing the Pact of Bogotd).
12. Resolution I: Declaration of San Jose, Seventh Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, San Jose, Costa Rica, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. C./ll.7 5
(1960).
13. See 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/1388 (1950) (outlining
the definition of a local dispute). The document states:
A dispute or situation may be considered as 'local' and appropriate for regional
action, within the meaning of Article 52, not so much because of the place where
it occurs or the region to which the parties or states concerned belong as because
they participate in a regional arrangement or constitute a regional agency of
peaceful settlement of disputes.
Id.
14. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 392, 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26); see Acevedo, Dis-
putes under consideration by the U.N. Security Council of Regional Bodies, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 242 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987)
(outlining the discussion in the Nicaragua case as to whether Security Council consid-
eration of a case precludes the International Court of Justice from considering the
case).
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United Nations. A clear absence of any legal definition and the restric-
tive interpretation of this concept made by the OAS Meeting of Con-
sultation has caused the confusion surrounding this issue. Although on
several occasions since 1960, a majority of OAS members have held
that "enforcement action" refers only to measures involving the use of
armed force, in 1982 the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs' apparently changed its previous narrow interpretation in
a resolution adopted in connection with the situation in the South
Atlantic.
In December 1985, the OAS General Assembly adopted several
amendments to the OAS Charter through the Protocol of Cartagena de
Indias (Protocol of Cartagena).16 Perhaps the most significant change
introduced in the Protocol of Cartagena concerns the clarification of
the competence of the OAS as a regional agency under Chapter VIII
of the United Nations Charter, vis-A-vis the competence of the United
Nations.
The text of article 23 now in force, adopted originally in 1948, pro-
vides that all international disputes that arise between members of the
OAS "shall be submitted" to the procedures established in the OAS
Charter before being referred to the United Nations Security Council.
This article appears to grant the OAS "priority" jurisdiction with re-
spect to the Security Council, in apparent disregard for the principles
established, inter alia, in articles 24, 34, 35, and 103 of the United
Nations Charter. In the Protocol of Cartagena, an effort was made to
adapt article 23 of the OAS Charter to the provisions contained in arti-
cle 52, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the United Nations Charter. In effect,
after determining that member states must submit international dis-
putes to the procedures for peaceful settlement established in the OAS
Charter, the new provision adds in its second paragraph that member
states shall not interpret this provision as an impairment of their rights
and obligations under articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations
Charter."
15. Resolution II: Serious Situation in the South Atlantic, Twentieth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./1I.20 doc. 80/82
rev. 2 (1982) [hereinafter Resolution 11] (urging the United States to lift the coercive
measures against Argentina and to refrain from providing material assistance to Great
Britain in the Malvinas conflict); Resolution: Coercive Measure, XVII Annual Meeting
of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the Ministerial Level, CIES
Res. 234, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. H./X.40/CIES.3730/82 corr. I (1982).
16. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American
States, Dec. 15, 1985, 66 OASTS 23, OEA/ser. A./41 (SEPF) (1986) [hereinafter
Protocol of Cartagena de Indias].
17. See Acevedo, Introductory Note, 25 I.L.M. 527, 527-28 (1986) (noting the
detailed review of the amendments).
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I. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
A. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The provisions of the United Nations Charter, while not necessarily
contradictory, are nonetheless confusing. The Charter not only recog-
nizes the validity of regional arrangements, but also confers jurisdiction
or competence on such arrangements for the resolution of regional dis-
putes through regional machinery. Article 52, paragraph 1 of the
United Nations Charter provides for the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies to deal with matters related to the maintenance of
international peace and security appropriate for regional action. The
pacific settlement of disputes is mentioned in article 33, paragraph 1.
Under this article, the parties to a dispute shall first seek a peaceful
solution through regional agencies or arrangements. In general, local
disputes are referred to in article 52, paragraph 2, which provides that
United Nations members entering into regional arrangements or consti-
tuting regional agencies shall "make every effort" to achieve pacific
settlement of "local" disputes through these regional arrangements or
agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
These two provisions, however, should be read in light of article 52,
paragraph 4, which expressly preserves the right of members of re-
gional arrangements to submit a dispute or situation directly to the
United Nations Security Council, or to the General Assembly pursuant
to article 11 of the Charter. 18 The members of regional arrangements
that are parties to a dispute or situation that is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security thus have no obliga-
tion to attempt to settle the dispute through regional arrangements
before submitting it to the United Nations Security Council or General
Assembly.
Professor Jimenez de Arechaga observed that, based on these provi-
sions, the member states of a regional agency or arrangement are enti-
tled to direct recourse to United Nations jurisdiction. He added that
member states also have the option, depending on the circumstances, to
have recourse to one jurisdiction, the United Nations, or the other, re-
gional, for legal protection. 1 The practice, particularly recent practice,
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, par. 4; see H. KELSEN, THE LAv OF THE UNITmD
NATIONS 434-435 (1951) (describing article 33, paragraph I and article 52, paragraph
2). According to Kelsen, this inconsistency, in turn, raised the question of whether
article 33, paragraph 1 must be interpreted as being restricted by article 52, paragraph
2. Id. "This question must be answered in the affirmative." Id. International practice
has proven this theory invalid. Id.
19. E. J. DE ARECHAGA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE I.As NACIONES UNDAS
356 (1958).
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of the Security Council and opinions of the ICJ tend to support this
assertion.
The United Nations Charter establishes further in article 52, para-
graph 3 that the Security Council shall encourage the development of
pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or
regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or
through reference from the Security Council. Furthermore, under arti-
cle 33, paragraph 2, the Security Council shall, when it deems neces-
sary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes through peaceful
means, including resort to regional arrangements or agencies.
Article 34 gives the Security Council the competence to investigate
any dispute or any situation likely to threaten international peace and
security and article 35, paragraph 1 authorizes any member to bring
any such dispute to the attention of the Security Council. In addition,
article 35, paragraph 2 provides that a state which is not a member of
the United Nations may also bring to the attention of the Security
Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party
if it accepts in advance, for the purpose of the dispute, the obligations
of pacific settlement provided for in the Charter.
Several provisions of the United Nations Charter thus clearly indi-
cate that regional agencies or arrangements are to be considered
subordinate to the United Nations. Consequently, regional procedures
for the peaceful settlement of disputes are not necessarily to be given
priority over the United Nations Security Council and General Assem-
bly under articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations Charter. This
subordinate status, in addition to being indicated in article 52,
paragraphs 2 and 4 is further specified, with regard to enforcement
action, in article 53 of the United Nations Charter, which states that
the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional ar-
rangements or agencies for enforcement under its authority. "But no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council ...
"20
Article 54 also seems to provide further evidence of the subordinate
status of the regional agencies or arrangements. Under that article,
"the Security Council shall at all times be kept informed of activities
undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by re-
gional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and
security."'"
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
21. Id. art. 54.
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Apart from the preceding provisions, the entire system, established
by the United Nations Charter for peaceful settlement through United
Nations organs, may be applicable in some way to matters appropriate
for regional action. 2
B. PROVISIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN INSTRUMENTS
1. OAS Charter
The questions of the right of the members of the OAS to refer their
disputes to the United Nations has been complicated, at least in part,
by article 23 of the OAS Charter which provides that "[a]ll interna-
tional disputes that may arise between American States shall be sub-
mitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being
referred to the Security Council of the United Nations."' 2 The wording
of this article appears to extend beyond the provisions of the United
Nations Charter. Indeed, according to article 23 of the OAS Charter,
it would not suffice for the parties to a dispute to "make every effort to
achieve pacific settlement of local disputes" as article 52, paragraph 2
of the United Nations Charter requires. Instead, they must submit
such disputes to the procedures set forth in the OAS Charter before
referral to the Security Council.
2. The Rio Treaty
Article 2 of the Rio Treaty states that the parties to the Treaty shall
endeavor to settle any controversy among themselves through proce-
dures in force in the Inter-American system before referring it to the
United Nations General Assembly or Security Council. In 1975, how-
ever, the member states adopted several amendments to the Rio
Treaty.24 The new Protocol, not yet in force, amends article 2 by elimi-
22. See Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (noting the
development and affirmation of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter); see also
Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, G.A. Res.
10, 37 U.N. GAOR C.6 Annex at 1, U.N. Doc. A/37/10 (1983) (affirming and devel-
oping the provisions of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter).
23. OAS CHARTER, supra note 4, art. 23.
24. Protocol of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
July 26, 1975, 61 OASTS 1, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. A./X./I (1975), reprinted in 1 THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, AND OTHER DocuMiENTs 359
(F.V. Garcia-Amador, ed. 1983) (noting the amendments to the Rio Treaty). The Pro-
tocol will enter into force when two-thirds of the Signatory States have deposited their
instruments of ratification. Id. As of September 30, 1988, seven states had ratified the
Protocol.
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nating the reference to the General Assembly. The amendment also
added that "[t]his provision shall not be interpreted as an impairment
of the rights and obligations of the States Parties under articles 34 and
35 of the Charter of the United Nations."
3. The Pact of Bogotb
Article II of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (the Pact of
Bogota) provides that:
The High Contracting Parties recognize the obligations to settle international
controversies by pacific procedures before referring them to the Security Council
of the United Nations. Consequently, in the event that a controversy arises be-
tween two or more signatory states which, in the opinion of the parties, cannot be
settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels, the parties
bind themselves to use the procedures established in the present treaty.2 5
The first paragraph of this article establishes an even stricter obliga-
tion on the parties to a dispute than the OAS Charter. It states that
the parties have the obligation to settle "international controversies"
before referring them to the United Nations Security Council. Thus, in
this case, it is not merely a question of submitting a dispute to regional
procedures, as with the OAS Charter, but of resolving it in accordance
with such procedures. Undoubtedly, this paragraph is, at best, poorly
drafted. The paragraph is inherently flawed because there would no
longer exist any dispute to refer to the Council or, for that matter, to
any other body under the present requirement that the parties settle a
dispute before referral to the Security Council.
4. The 1985 Protocol of Amendments to the OAS Charter
As stated above, the Protocol of Cartagena introduced an important
change in the OAS Charter. The Protocol reaffirmed the right that
OAS members have under articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations
Charter. In particular, member states have the right to refer any dis-
pute, or any situation that "might lead to international friction or give
25. Pact of Bogota, supra note 11, art. II. Article II of the Pact of Bogotd contains
something tantamount to a veto to which any state party in a dispute can resort, if such
party believes that it can settle the dispute by direct diplomatic means. Id.; see
Robledo, Naciones Unidas y Sistema Interamericano, reprinted in OAS Doc. OEA/
ser. G./CEESI doc.47/74 14 (1974) (observing the application of the Pact). Professor
Gomez Robledo made the observation that "if only one of the parties insists that the
dispute, in its view, can be settled through direct negotiations, under the terms of the
Pact it cannot be forced to use any of the means of pacific settlement stipulated
therein." Id.
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rise to a dispute," directly to the Security Council.26
II. REGIONAL VERSUS UNIVERSAL AUTHORITY IN
PRACTICE
A. A COMPLAINT ORIGINALLY PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL WHERE THE OAS HAS, IN PRACTICE, EXERCISED PRIMARY
JURISDICTION: THE GUATEMALAN CASE
The first occasion upon which the issue of the "priority" of the OAS
as a forum for settlement of disputes between OAS members occurred
on June 19, 1954, when the representative of Guatemala requested an
urgent meeting of the Security Council. He alleged that his country
was the object of "an open aggression."27
This case is significant for several reasons. First, the case in part
related to the so-called "East-West" conflict in which Guatemala found
itself an unwitting victim. 8 As early as April 1, 1953, the Permanent
Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations delivered a com-
munication to the Secretary General describing "a series of facts
amounting to open hostility and a threat of intervention in the internal
affairs of the Republic of Guatemala."2' The same communication was
presented to the Security Council on April 15, merely to be put "on
record in case events should occur constituting a violation of Guate-
mala's territory and national independence." 30 Four days later, the gov-
ernment of Guatemala complained to the Security Council that the
governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, at the instigation of certain
foreign monopolies, had perpetrated an open aggression."
26. Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, supra note 16, art. II. The Protocol of Carta-
gena entered into force on November 16, 1988.
27. Cablegram dated June 19, 1954 from the Minister of Foreign Relations of
Guatemala to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council
at 3, U.N. Doc. S/3232 (1954).
28. Drier, The Special Nature of Western Hemisphere Experience with Interna-
tional Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMI-
SPHERE 9, 34 (R. Gregg ed. 1968). Drier observed that "[tihe outright failures of the
regional collective security system, of course, have been those concerned not with truly
inter-American disputes but with broader power conflicts, essentially those of the Cold
War, which lie outside of the competence of a regional system as such. Such was the
case of Guatemala in 1954 and of Cuba in 1960." Id.
29. Letter of the Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary General at 2, U.N. Doc. S/2988 (1953).
30. Id. at I.
31. Simultaneously the Government of Guatemala appealed to the Inter-American
Peace Committee, a subsidiary organ of the OAS Council, but subsequently withdrew
its request to allow treatment of its cause exclusively by the Security Council. The
expression "foreign monopolies" referred to the United Fruit Company, some of whose
85% uncultivated land had been expropriated by the Government of Guatemala.
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On June 20 and 25, the Security Council fully discussed the jurisdic-
tional issue at their 675th and 676th meetings. At the first meeting, the
two Latin American members of the Council, Brazil and Colombia,
presented a draft resolution that indicated the availability of Inter-
American machinery established for the specific purpose of dealing
with Inter-American peace and security. These members, in turn,
asked that the Security Council refer the complaint of the government
of Guatemala to the OAS for urgent consideration.32
The Guatemalan representative replied that his government, "exer-
cising the option which is open to the Organization's members, offi-
cially declined to allow the [OAS] and the Inter-American Peace Com-
mittee to concern themselves with this situation."3 3 He argued that the
issue was simply aggression under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, as opposed to a dispute under Chapter VI.3" J. Fawcett
pointed out that the legal issue before the Council was whether the
armed intervention of which Guatemala complained was an act of ag-
gression or a "dispute," particularly a "local dispute" within the mean-
ing of article 52, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the United Nations Charter. 5
Fawcett's contention is noteworthy because the representative of Gua-
temala based his government's appeal on articles 34, 35, and 39 of the
Charter which, he argued, gave his country an undisputed right to ap-
peal to the Security Council. He added that the OAS might be appro-
priate for trying to resolve peaceful disputes among members, but was
quite incapable of dealing with a situation where an invasion had al-
ready taken place.3 6 Consequently, the Guatemalan representative
American officials maintained that the disagreements between the United States and
Guatemala had nothing to do with the United Fruit Company, but rather concerned
the failure of President Arbenz to oust Communists from his government. Neverthe-
less, "American national security considerations were never compelling in the case of
Guatemala. State Department analysts in late 1953 treated the influence of Commu-
nists as relatively trivial except insofar as they had Arbenz's ear." S. SCHLESINGER &
S. KINZER, BITTER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATE-
MALA 107 (1982).
32. 9 U.N. SCOR (675th mtg.) at 15, U.N. Doc. S/3907 (1954).
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id.
35. Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, in 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 103, 347-
79 (1961).
36. 9 U.N. SCOR (675th mtg.) at 20, U.N. Doc. S/3907 (1954). Later the Guate-
malan Representative suggested that the complaint could be regarded as a situation
"which could lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute" contemplated in
article 34 of the United Nations Charter. In the Security Council the question was
described as a "situation," a "dispute," a "matter," a "complaint of aggression," and
an "act of aggression," but the Council made no determination as to whether the mat-
ter was or was not a "dispute" as envisaged in article 34 or whether it was subject to
the provisions of article 39 of the United Nations Charter. Fawcett, supra note 35, at
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asked the Security Council to call on the governments of Honduras and
Nicaragua to halt the operations and to apprehend those who were in-
volved in organizing and directing them. Finally, he requested that the
Security Council establish an observation committee to be sent to Gua-
temala, and to Honduras and Nicaragua if necessary, to verify whether
the charges his government had made were well-founded. In connection
with the Guatemalan request, Evan Luard pointed out that "[t]his was
a procedure not unlike that which the [United Nations] had used in
dealing with the somewhat similar charges raised by the Greek Govern-
ment against its neighbors."
37
The draft resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Council
subsequently unanimously approved a resolution based on a draft
presented by France which called for the "immediate termination of
any action likely to cause bloodshed." Furthermore, the Council asked
the members of the United Nations to abstain from assisting such
actions.38
On June 25, the Security Council met again at the request of the
representative of the Soviet Union and resumed the debate on the juris-
dictional issue. Mr. Lodge, the United States representative, argued
that the most critical issue was the relationship of the United Nations,
a universal organization, to regional organizations, notably the OAS.
The United States representative added that the failure of the Security
Council to "respect the right of the OAS to achieve a peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute between Guatemala and its neighbors would pro-
duce a catastrophe of such dimensions as will gravely impair the future
effectiveness of both the United Nations itself and of the OAS. ' '39
The United States representative argued that Guatemala's effort to
bypass the OAS was a violation of the United Nations Charter, article
52, paragraph 2. He then warned the members of the Council that if
the Security Council assumed jurisdiction, "the clock of peace will have
been turned back and disorder will replace order.""'
Despite these strong statements, Denmark, Lebanon, and New Zea-
land joined the Soviet Union in voting for an immediate United Na-
tions discussion of the case. Brazil and Colombia voted against the dis-
379; REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE at 448, U.N. Sales No. 1957.V.4
(Supp. 1) (Vol. II).
37. See I E. LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS: THE YEARS OF WEST-
ERN DOMINATION, 1945-1955 296 (1982) (stating that this procedure resembles that
used in dealing with Greek complaints against Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia).
38. 9 U.N. SCOR (675th mtg.) at 38, U.N. Doc. S/3907 (1954).
39. Id. at 26-28.
40. Id.
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cussion, along with China, Turkey, and the United States. France and
the United Kingdom abstained. The representatives of both abstaining
states maintained that their actions did not signify that the Security
Council was divesting itself of its responsibility but failed to explain
how else the decision of the Security Council might be interpreted. The
resolution thus failed and the issue remained unsettled. Having failed
to obtain any satisfaction from the Security Council, the Guatemalan
government decided to cooperate with the Inter-American Peace Com-
mittee, which then arranged for an investigating group to visit Guate-
mala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. This committee, despite the serious-
ness of the situation, did not leave Washington until June 29.41
Meanwhile, on June 26, in an obvious attempt to emphasize their
concern with the situation, the United States and nine other members
of the OAS (Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru) requested that the Meeting
of Consultation be convened pursuant to articles 6 and 11 of the Rio
Treaty.42 These countries wanted to consider the danger to the peace
and security of the continent and to agree upon measures in view of the
"demonstrated intervention of the international communist movement
in the Republic of Guatemala. ' 3 Inis Claude observed that:
[I]t appears that the transfer of the case from the Security Council to the OAS
was not simply a matter of having the latter substitute for the former as a peace-
ful settlement mechanism, but a device for reversing the terms of the case. The
OAS was prepared to treat Guatemala as a defendant, not the plaintiff. Whereas
the Security Council had appealed for the cessation of the attack the OAS de-
clared its intent to consider means to demise the government of Guatemala.
4
It is clear, as Professor Bowett pointed out:
[T] hat much of this practice and the jurisdictional conflict between the OAS and
the Security Council is politically motivated. The [United States] has feared
that, within the Security Council, the veto of the Soviet Union will frustrate
settlement and the Soviet Union has opposed reference to the OAS because it
feared that the influence of the [United States] within the OAS would
predominate.45
41. Before the Inter-American Peace Committee reached Guatemala, however, the
government of Guatemala had fallen and a cease-fire had been arranged. See Report of
the Inter-American Peace Committee, OEA/ser. C./CIP-131/54 1 (1954).
42. 1 GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, THE
INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE: APPLICATIONS, 1948-1956 165
(1973).
43. Id.
44. I. CLAUDE, supra note 7, at 282.
45. Bowett, The United Nations and Peaceful Settlement, in DAVID DAVIES ME-
MORIAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, THE LE-
GAL ASPECTS 191 (1972); see Moore, The Role of Regional Arrangements in the
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The Guatemalan case, insofar as it involved the question of "prior-
ity" of competence between the United Nations and a regional ar-
rangement, underscored the importance of distinguishing between a
dispute under Chapter VI and an act subject to the provisions of Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter. The government of Guatemala
contended that it was the victim of aggression and that it was, conse-
quently, entitled to take its case to the Security Council."8 The United
States maintained, in the Security Council, that this was a local dispute
that had to be dealt with by the OAS. The United States, Brazil, and
Colombia based the case on article 33 and Chapter VIII of the United
Nations Charter, while Guatemala invoked articles 34, 35, and 39,
respectively.47
As this Article will show, a similar situation occurred in 1983 be-
tween Nicaragua, Honduras, and the United States. More importantly,
as a result of the efforts made to prevent any Security Council discus-
sion of the events in Guatemala, neither the OAS nor the United Na-
tions could assist the government of Guatemala against an action re-
quiring application of Chapter VII of the Charter, that is to say, an
"[a]ction with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
and acts of aggression."
B. CASES ORIGINALLY TAKEN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT
WERE DEFERRED TO THE OAS BY A DECISION OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL
Maintenance of World Order, in THE FuTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
131 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971) [hereinafter Moore: The Role of Regional Ar-
rangements] (observing the concept of regional authority). Professor John Norton
Moore states that:
Since the major tests of regional authority have involved a regional organization
identified with a major cold war power, tests of regional authority have been
perceived by all concerned primarily in cold-war terms. Thus, the United States
tends to equate regional autonomy with OAS autonomy and press for broad re-
gional authority. And the Soviet Union equates regional autonomy with auton-
omy of a United States-dominated OAS and opposes increased regional auton-
omy. As a result, the general issue of regional versus universal authority tends to
be subordinated to more immediate cold-war interests.
Id.
46. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing the contentions of the
Republic of Guatemala).
47. See E. J. DE ARECHAGA, supra note 19, at 362-363 (noting the broad scope of
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter).
The refusal to consider a request such as the one made by Guatemala to the
Security Council constitutes a violation of the provisions of the U.N. Charter
which give the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security whenever there is an act of aggression. The pro-
visions of Chapter VII are by no means limited by those that regulate the action
of regional arrangements.
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1. Without the consent of the complainant State: The Cuban Case
(1960-1961)
In 1960 a situation similar to the one in Guatemala began to develop
in Cuba. On July 11, 1960, the Cuban Government complained to the
Security Council about what it characterized as the United States pol-
icy of threats, reprisals, and aggressive acts against Cuba. To prevent
referral of its complaint to the OAS forum, the government of Cuba
invoked, primarily, article 52, paragraph 4, and article 103 of the
United Nations Charter.48 The United States government denied the
Cuban charges of intervention in a letter to the President of the Secur-
ity Council,49 and argued that the Inter-American Peace Committee
had been investigating tensions in the Caribbean for the last year.5 0
Two days after Cuba filed the complaint with the Security Council,
Peru requested the convocation of the OAS Meeting of Consultation in
accordance with article 39 of the Charter of Bogotd, to consider hemi-
spheric solidarity, defense of the regional system, and the defense of
American democratic principles. 1
At the Security Council meetings on July 18 and 19,52 Argentina
48. U.N. Doc. S/4378 (1960). Cuba also invoked articles 24, 34, 35, paragraph 1,
and article 36 of the United Nations Charter. Id.
49. Letter Dated 15 July 1960 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4388 (1960); see Bowett, supra note 7, at 861 (noting that
"the substance of [the Cuban] charges.., was soon to be supported by the Bay of Pigs
invasion on April 17, 1961").
50. See M. ETzIONI, THE MAJORITY OF ONE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF REGIONAL
COMPATIBILITY 148 (1970) (stating that the task of the Inter-American Peace Com-
mittee, to investigate exile-incited tension in the Caribbean, had, in fact, nothing to do
with the Cuban charges of United States aggression).
51. The Meeting of Consultation was held in San Jose, Costa Rica, from August
22 to August 29, 1960. This Meeting approved 13 resolutions, the most important of
which was the "Declaration of San Jose," which, inter alia, decided to:
[C]ondemn . . .the intervention or the threat of intervention . . .by any ex-
tracontinental power in the affairs of the American republics ... [r]eject the
attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic, or so-
cial situation of any American state, inasmuch as that attempt is capable of
destroying hemispheric unity and endangering the peace and security of the
hemisphere ... [r]eaffirm that the inter-American system is incompatible with
any form of totalitarianism; [p]roclaim that all member states of the regional
organization are under obligation to submit to the discipline of the inter-Ameri-
can system; [djeclare that all controversies between member states should be
resolved by the measures for peaceful solution that are contemplated in the
inter-American system.
Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc. OEA/ser.
C./II.7 4-5 (1960) (emphasis added).
52. 15 U.N. SCOR (875th and 876th mtgs.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4395 (1960).
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and Ecuador sponsored a resolution which contained certain pragmatic
arguments in favor of the competence of the OAS. 3 It requested that
the Security Council suspend consideration of the case until the OAS
could submit a report. The Security Council approved the draft with
Poland and the Soviet Union abstaining. This action constituted, in ef-
fect, a repetition of the Guatemalan case.
Some of the members of the Security Council contended that the
resolution did not impair the United Nations' primary jurisdiction and
the right of members to have direct recourse to the Security Council.
In some respects, however, those advocating the priority of OAS com-
petence obtained substantially more than they did in the Guatemalan
case. In the case of Cuba, the Security Council had actually passed a
resolution referring the case to the OAS."
There was a second phase of this case. In October 1960 Cuba ap-
pealed again to the United Nations but it followed a different strategy.
This time Cuba took its complaints to the General Assembly instead of
the Security Council.55 The General Assembly referred the case to the
First Committee which did not take up the case until April 15, 1961.
Meanwhile, on December 31, 1960, and January 3, 1961, Cuba
asked the Security Council to include in its agenda the consideration of
the complaint. Cuba relied on articles 24, 31, 32, 34, 35, paragraph 1,
article 52, paragraph 4, and article 103 of the United Nations Charter
as well as article 102 of the OAS Charter."" The Council agreed to
discuss the Cuban case on January 4, 1961. A draft resolution proposed
by Chile and Ecuador endorsing the principle of non-intervention and
bringing peaceful settlement of the conflict without mentioning the
OAS did not obtain the necessary support. Consequently, the resolution
was withdrawn. The Security Council then ended its consideration of
the case. The fate of the complaint of Cuba remained solely with the
First Committee of the General Assembly, which discussed it on April
15, 1961, the day of the Bay of Pigs invasion.
A few days later, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that
53. Id. at 2. The resolution also invites the OAS to lend assistance to the realiza-
tion of a peaceful settlement. Id.
54. It is important to observe, however, that technically the Security Council, in
approving the resolution, did not abdicate its jurisdiction on the Cuban complaint.
55. 15 U.N. GAOR (909th mtg.) at 787, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 909 (1960); 15 U.N.
GAOR (910th mtg.) at 801, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 910 (1960).
56. Letter dated 31 Dec. 1960 from the Minister for External Relations of Cuba
addressed to the President of the Security Council at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4605 (1960);
Letter dated 3 January 1961 from the Minister for External Relations of Cuba ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4611 (1961). The
Cuban Minister for External Relations requested an immediate meeting of the Security
Council, stating that new and alarming developments demanded it. Id.
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urged the member states to assist in achieving a settlement through
peaceful means in accordance with the principles and purposes of the
United Nations Charter. The resolution asked that a report on the
measures taken be submitted to the General Assembly at its sixteenth
session. The resolution also asked the member states to abstain from
aggravating existing tensions.57 Clearly, this resolution did not grant
any particular right of priority to the OAS. Neither the United Na-
tions nor the OAS took any further action on the complaint after the
adoption of this resolution.
2. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
On October 22, 1962, the United States government requested an
immediate convocation of the Organ of Consultation pursuant to article
6 of the Rio Treaty. The United States wished to consider the action
that should be taken "for the common defense and for the maintenance
of peace and security of the continent."5' 8 Although the OAS and the
United Nations acted simultaneously pursuant to the request of the
United States, this case is only of marginal importance with regard to
jurisdiction.
The OAS Council-adopted a resolution on October 23, 1962. Acting
provisionally as Organ of Consultation, the Council resolved to recom-
mend that:
[M]ember states, in accordance with [A]rticles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively,
including the use force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the gov-
ernment of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet Powers mili-
tary material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of
the continent."'5 9
This resolution provided, in this particular emergency, legitimation for
the quarantine measures and, consequently, the basis for its symbolic
multilateral character.
At the same time, however, the United States requested a meeting of
the Security Council to deal with the dangerous threat to peace. 60 At
this meeting, the United States presented a draft resolution whereby
the Council would call for removal of the missiles. The resolution
57. Id.
58. 2 GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, IN-
TER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE: APPLICATIONS 1960-1972 109
(1973) [hereinafter TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE: APPLICATIONS].
59. Id. at 112.
60. 17 U.N. SCOR (1022d mtg.) at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1022 (1962).
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would authorize the Secretary General to send an observer group to
verify and report on compliance with the resolution and to lift the quar-
antine after the withdrawal of the missiles. The resolution urgently rec-
ommended that the United States and the Soviet Union confer to re-
move the threat to peace and security that the crisis caused."
Thus, in this case, both the OAS and the United Nations exercised
jurisdiction on the same question. The United States recognized, how-
ever, that the OAS was not the appropriate organ in which to settle its
dispute with Moscow, even though it might be used to give an appear-
ance of legitimacy to measures that otherwise would require justifica-
tion under article 51 of the United Nations Charter."
3. With the acceptance of the complainant states: The Haitian Case
1963
The complaint by Haiti against the Dominican Republic in May
1963, showed further evidence of the support of OAS members for
maintaining access to the United Nations. On May 5, 1963, the Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs of Haiti sent a telegram to the President of the
Security Council requesting, pursuant to articles 34 and 35, paragraph
1 of the United Nations Charter, an urgent meeting of the Council to
consider the situation arising from alleged repeated threats of aggres-
sion and attempted interference from the Dominican Republic. 3 The
next day the Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic transmit-
ted to the Secretary General of the United Nations, through a note
verbale, the text of a letter from the President of the Dominican Re-
public to the Chairman of the Council of the OAS. The letter states
that his government would agree to cooperate with OAS appointed
Commission, acting as Provisional Organ of Consultation, to study the
situation in loco."
During the Security Council's consideration of this matter,65 the rep-
resentative of the Dominican Republic observed that the OAS was al-
ready considering the Haitian government's question. He asserted that
the OAS had already taken steps toward finding a peaceful solution to
61. Id.
62. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMMONDS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS, COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 359 (3d ed. 1969).
63. Telegram dated 5 May 1963 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti
addressed to the President of the Security Council at 2, U.N. Doc. S/5302 (1963).
64. Note Verbale dated 6 May 1963 from the Permanent Mission of the Domini-
can Republic addressed to the Secretary General at 1, U.N. Doe. S/5306 (1963).
65. 18 U.N. SCOR (1035th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1035 (1963); 2 REPER-
TORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 278-79 (1955).
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the problem and therefore should deal with the matter. After quoting
the United Nations Charter, article 52, paragraphs 2 and 3, he further
stated that those provisions simply applied the principle established in
articles 33 and 36. The settlement of international disputes should pref-
erably be implemented by such peaceful means chosen by the parties.
He expressed his government's hope that the Security Council would
decide to suspend the consideration of the matter and leave it to the
OAS. 6 In the opinion of the representative of Haiti, the dispute was of
the same nature as those mentioned in articles 34 and 35, because
there was a threat to the peace of the region.
Although the Security Council directed this case to the OAS with
the agreement of the complainant, 7 the debate in the Security Council
revealed increasing support among OAS members for the right of
members of regional arrangements to bring a local dispute directly to
the Security Council. For example, the Representative of Venezuela
stated that states should exhaust peaceful settlement procedures at the
regional level before seeking United Nations consideration. He added
that any member of the OAS had a right to bring a regional contro-
versy to the Security Council. 8
4. The Panamanian Case (1964)
In a letter dated January 10, 1964, the representative of Panama
requested that the President of the Security Council, in accordance
with articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1 of the Charter, convene an early
meeting. He wished the Council to consider urgent matters pertaining
to the Canal Zone. According to the Panamanian representative, a
tense situation had developed because of repeated threats and acts of
aggression committed by the government of the United States in Pan-
ama. These acts, he argued, infringed its territorial sovereignty, vio-
lated its territorial integrity and constituted in practice a serious dan-
ger to international peace and security.
During the meeting of the Council on January 10, 1964, the repre-
sentative of Panama stated that his country was the victim of an unpro-
voked armed attack by the United States armed forces stationed in the
Panama Canal Zone. He requested the intervention of the Security
Council to restore peace and tranquillity in the Canal Zone. He also
66. See 2 TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE: APPLICATIONS, supra note 58, at
161-212 (giving a detailed analysis of this case within the OAS).
67. The Security Council remained seized of the question.
68. 18 U.N. SCOR (1036th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1036 (1963); 18 U.N.
GAOR (Supp. No. 2) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/5502 (1963).
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requested that the Security Council find a lasting solution to the
question.
The representative of the United States noted that the Inter-Ameri-
can Peace Committee of the OAS had unanimously agreed, pursuant
to the request of both governments, to go to Panama to ascertain the
facts. He then denied the allegations of United States aggression and
stated that the United Nations Charter, in both article 33 and article
52, provided for peaceful settlement of local disputes through regional
agencies, as did article 20, now article 23, of the OAS Charter. With-
out derogating from the responsibilities of the Council, he asserted, lo-
cal disputes could most effectively be dealt with through regional pro-
cedures. While expressing confidence in the OAS' ability to handle the
situation, the representative of Brazil stated that the Security Council
and should also be seized of the matter, and should, and adopt emer-
gency measures applicable to the case.6 9 Several members of the Secur-
ity Council, while agreeing that a regional agency could give substan-
tial assistance to the Security Council, supported the proposal of the
representative of Brazil. They supported action by the regional organi-
zation that might provide the Council with the necessary assistance for
handling the problem.
The Panamanian representative stated that the proposal by Brazil
was not incompatible with previous OAS action. The United States
representative also welcomed the Brazilian proposal. The Security
Council directed the question to the OAS and decided that the matter
would remain on the agenda of the Council."0
C. SHARING OF JURISDICTION
1. Parallel Action by the Security Council after the OAS had
already seized of the matter: The Dominican Republic Case (1965)
In April 1965, the United States landed armed forces in the Domini-
can Republic, initially to protect its own nationals and nationals of
69. 19 U.N. SCOR (1086th mtg.) at 44-45, U.N. Doe. S/PV. 1086 (1964). The
representative of Brazil suggested the following course of action:
We :.. would like to express our confidence in the OAS' ability to handle that
delicate situation. We believe, nevertheless, that the Security Council should also
be seized of the matter and adopt measures of an emergency character which
might be applicable to the case in issue.
.... I would suggest.., that the President of the Security Council be author-
ized to address an appeal to the governments of the United States of America
and Panama to bring to an immediate end the exchange of fire and the blood-
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other countries. At the request of Chile, the Meeting of Consultation of
the OAS was convoked on April 30, 1965, pursuant to articles 39 and
40 of the Charter of Bogotd.71 The agenda specified a discussion of the
armed strife in the Dominican Republic. 2
On May 1, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation established a Special
Committee to aid in obtaining a cease-fire and to assist in evacuating
foreign nationals and Dominican citizens. The Committee would also
investigate other aspects of the Dominican situation.73 Before the arri-
val of the Special Committee in Santo Domingo, however, the Papal
Nuncio in the Dominican Republic arranged a temporary cease-fire.
The Committee then focused its efforts on extending and ratifying the
cease-fire. As a result, the parties signed the Act of Santo Domingo on
May 5, 1965.7"
Subsequently, on May 6, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation ap-
proved a proposal presented by the United States calling for an Inter-
American Force,7 5 the formation of which, ipso facto, transformed the
American forces in Dominican territory into a multilateral OAS force.
At the same time, while the first session of the Meeting of Consultation
was taking place on May 1, the Soviet Union requested an urgent
meeting of the Security Council to consider the United States armed
interference in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic.7 6
The Security Council took no action during the first few days of dis-
cussion. On May 14, the Security Council, responding to an urgent re-
quest by Dr. Jottin Cury, who called himself the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic,
unanimously adopted a resolution based on a draft presented by Jor-
dan, Malaysia, and the Ivory Coast that called for a strict cease-fire.
The resolution also invited the Secretary General to send a representa-
tive to the Dominican Republic to report to the Security Council. Fi-
nally, the resolution called for cooperation with the representative of
the Secretary General.77
71. Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc.
OEA/ser.C./II.10 24 (1970) [hereinafter Tenth Meeting of Consultation].
72. Id.
73. See id. at 9 (noting Resolution I: Special Committee to Seek the Reestablish-
ment of Peace and Normal Conditions in the Dominican Republic).
74. See THE OAS CHRONICLE, Aug. 1965, at 28-29 (noting the Act of Santo
Domingo).
75. Tenth Meeting of Consultation, supra note 71, at 10-12 (noting Resolution III:
Inter-American Force, adopted at 3d Plenary Session, May 6, 1965).
76. 20 U.N. SCOR (1208th mtg.) at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1208 (1965).
77. Id. at 6. In compliance with this resolution, No. 203, the United Nations Secre-
tary General sent an advance party to Santo Domingo, under Major General I.J.
Rikhye. Id. The Secretary General subsequently appointed Mr. Jose Antonio Mayobre,
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The members of the Security Council did not challenge the compe-
tence of the Security Council to deal with this particular dispute, even
though the OAS was still actively involved in obtaining a settlement.
As Ana L. Levin pointed out, "the Security Council activities were not
limited, as they have been in previous cases, to formal discussion and
the adoption of hortatory resolutions."78 This was a case of exercising
parallel consideration of the same situation, i.e., "concurrent" jurisdic-
tion of both organizations."9
Some authors criticized the concurrent jurisdictional roles of the
OAS and of the United Nations. For example, F. V. Garcia-Amador,
then Director of the Department of Legal Affairs of the General Secre-
tariat of the OAS, considered that in light of previous United Nations
practice there seemed to be no justification for the Security Council's
action. He stated that:
Since this amounts to an instance of concurrent jurisdiction, intervention by the
world organization while the regional agency is making all possible efforts to
reach a pacific settlement is a form of 'abuse of power'. The Security Council
could very well, as it has done repeatedly in the past, have allowed time for the
regional action to produce results, especially inasmuch as some results had al-
ready been attained. 0
The United Nations Secretary General, however, publicly voiced some
concern about the role of the OAS in the Dominican Republic.8"
2. Action by the OAS Meeting of Consultation after the Security
Council was seized of the case: The Malvinas Conflict (1982)
The question of United Nations and OAS competence developed into
a new form of parallel action on the part of both organizations as a
result of the Malvinas conflict. This case of parallel action was com-
pletely different from any previous case that had arisen between the
United Nations and the OAS.
then Executive Director of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), as
his personal representative in the Dominican Republic. Id.
78. See THE UN-OAS RELATIONS IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY FELD at 68, 75
UNITAR Publication No. E (1974) [hereinafter RELATIONS IN PEACE AND SECUrTr,]
(noting the statement by Ana Levin).
79. See Moore, supra note 45, at 148 (observing that "there seems to be a general
understanding that regional organizations may exercise concurrent jurisdiction, at least
in the absence of United Nations terminating regional jurisdiction").
80. Garcia-Amador, The Dominican Situation, The Jurisdiction of the Regional
Organization, AMERICAS, July 1965, at 1, 3.
81. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1965, at 1; N.Y. Times, May 28, 1965, at 1; Garcia-
Amador, supra note 80, at 3 (1965).
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a. Background8 2
On April 1, 1982, when news of an imminent invasion of the
Malvinas by Argentine forces began to circulate, the Security Council
met in informal consultations. The President of the Council issued a
strong appeal for restraint on behalf of that organ to the representa-
tives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom.83
On April 2, Argentine forces invaded the Malvinas. The Security
Council met immediately and discussed a draft resolution presented by
the representative of the United Kingdom.84 The text of this draft was
virtually identical to the text of Resolution 502, adopted by the Secur-
ity Council at its 2350th meeting on April 3, 1982, which demanded an
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the islands and
called upon both Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplo-
matic solution to the fundamental dispute. Immediately thereafter the
British government, invoking article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
initiated military preparations with the objective of securing the with-
drawal of the Argentine forces from the islands, in case of noncompli-
ance with the Security Council demand.
Argentina, at that time, was willing to consider the settlement of its
dispute with Great Britain, but would not negotiate sovereignty over
the Malvinas. Argentina argued that the Malvinas were part of its na-
tional territory which Great Britain had occupied by an act of aggres-
sion, by the use of force, since 1833. Therefore, a British invasion to
recapture the islands would constitute an act of aggression. 85
While attempting to recapture the islands by force the British gov-
ernment also used economic and diplomatic means as part of a so-
82. Parsons, The Falkland Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June, 1982,
59 INT'L AFFAIRS 169, 169-78 (1983); Fisher, Falklands and the U.N., N.Y. Times,
Apr. 20, 1982, at A27; Connell-Smith, The OAS and the Falklands Conflict, THE
WORLD TODAY, Sept. 1982, at 340-47.
83. 37 U.N. GAOR (2345th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/14944 (1982).
[T]he Security Council, mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter
of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
expresses its concern about the tension in the region of the Falkland Islands (Is-
las Malvinas). The Security Council accordingly calls on the Governments of
Argentina and the United Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at this time
and in particular to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and to
continue the search for a diplomatic solution. The Security Council will remain
seized of the question.
Id.
84. 37 U.N. GAOR (2351st mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/149472 (1982).
85. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 (prescribing that "[a]ll Members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered").
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called "graduated pressure" on Argentina.8" A period of intense activ-
ity followed in the United Nations. At the same time the United
States, through Secretary of State Alexander Haig, made an effort to
mediate the dispute. Meanwhile, on April 19, with the British forces
ready to engage their Argentine counterparts in the South Atlantic,
Argentina requested the convocation of the OAS Organ of Consulta-
tion pursuant to articles 6 and 13 of the Rio Treaty.87 On April 21,
1982, the Permanent Council of the OAS convoked the Organ of Con-
sultation to consider the "serious situation in the South Atlantic," and
decided that the Organ of Consultation should meet on April 26, 1982,
in Washington, D.C. 8 Thus, the OAS took a first step toward creating
a potential conflict of jurisdiction.
Although unusual, it is not per se inconsistent or in conflict with the
jurisdiction of the Security Council for a regional arrangement such as
the OAS to deal with a conflict after the Security Council has been
seized of the matter. After all, the United Nations and the OAS have
essentially the same purposes. In certain situations, their activities may
reinforce each other.
b. Actions of the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation
The Twentieth Meeting of Consultation acted twice on the Malvinas
conflict.8 9 Between April 26 and 28, 1982, the Meeting adopted a reso-
86. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE FACTS
12 (1982). In addition to unilateral economic sanctions, on April 6, 1982 the British
Government formally requested that the European Economic Community (EEC) join
in the economic sanctions against Argentina. Id. On April 14 the EEC decided to im-
pose a ban on imports of Argentine products. Id. On April 17, 1982, other members of
the Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand) and Hong Kong joined in the
EEC action. Id.
87. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. G./CP. doc.1253/82 1 (1982); OAS Doec. OEA/ser. F./
11.20. doec. 6/82 1 (1982).
88. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. G./CP/SA - CP/RES doec. 493/82 33, 33 (1982) (stating
that eighteen countries voted in favor of convocation of the Organ of Consultation and
three - Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States - abstained). OAS
Doc. OEA/ser. G./CP./RES. 360 doc. 493/82 corr. 1 33 (1982); OAS Doec. OEA/ser.
F./II.20 doc.4/82 1 (1982).
89. See generally Franck, Dulce et Decorum Est. The Strategic Role of Legal
Principles in The Falklands War, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 109, 109-24 (1983) (discussing
the Malvinas crisis as a case study of the potential role of international legal principles
in world politics, and the danger of ignoring them); Hassan, The Sovereignty Dispute
over the Falkland Islands, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 53, 61 (1982) (discussing the practical
effect of the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation); Moore, The International System
Snarls in Falklands War, 76 AM,. J. INT'L L. 830, 830-31 (1982) [hereinafter Moore:
Falklands War] (discussing the actions of the OAS during the Malvinas conflict);
Reisman, The Struggle for the Falklands, 93 YALE L.J. 287, 287-317 (1983) (discuss-
ing other aspects of the Malvinas conflict).
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lution urging the government of the United Kingdom to end "the hos-
tilities it is carrying on within the security region defined in article 4 of
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance." The resolution
also urged the United Kingdom to refrain from any act affecting Inter-
American peace and security, and urged the government of Argentina
to refrain from taking any action exacerbating the situation. The reso-
lution additionally urged both governments to call a truce that would
make it possible to resume negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement
of the conflict.90
No specific decision on the question of jurisdiction resulted from the
discussions of the Organ of Consultation." The positions taken by sev-
eral delegations indicated, however, that a greater number of OAS
members would now advocate the right of the American states to sub-
mit their regional disputes or situations directly to the United Nations.
Four different views on the subject were put forward.
1. States that advocated the exclusive competence of the United
Nations
The representative of Colombia took the most extreme view. He
stated that the states must approach the question as a disturbance of
the peace. Regardless of potential action at a regional level, the author-
ity of the Security Council was paramount, as Resolution 502 had
shown. In essence the Delegate of Colombia argued that the Rio
Treaty did not apply to the conflict.92
Unfortunately, the reasons he used to draw his conclusions reveal
that the Colombian representative utterly misconstrued the purposes of
the Treaty and the nature of the OAS as a regional arrangement. In
his view, the Rio Treaty did not apply because the Organ of Consulta-
tion could not adopt any of the measures provided for in article 8 of
that Treaty.93 Therefore, he declared, the weak resolution adopted bore
90. See Minutes of the Second Plenary Session, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doe.
33/82 6-7 (1982) (noting that the resolution was adopted by 17 votes in favor and 4
abstentions (Chile, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States)).
91. Of course, the fact that the Organ of Consultation was convoked, discussed the
question and adopted a resolution constitutes in itself evidence that the majority of the
members of the OAS that are parties to the Rio Treaty thought (and determined) that
they were competent to act in application of that Treaty.
92. That in itself constitutes a controversial view. It is suggested that, prima facie,
there was no impediment against applying the Treaty if its application would have been
consistent with the decision previously adopted by the Security Council, that is to say,
consistent with Resolution 502. It is, however, desirable that regional arrangements
should not interfere in situations where the Security Council has already taken action.
93. Article 8 of the Rio Treaty provides that "the measures on which the Organ of
Consultation may agree comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of diplo-
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no relation to any of the mechanisms of collective security of the hemi-
sphere.94 According to his interpretation, the Treaty could only apply
in situations where the Organ of Consultation could take measures for
self-defense or for the maintenance of peace and security.
Neither the provisions of the Treaty nor the practice of the OAS
support that interpretation. From the discussions on the Rio Treaty it
should be clear that technically the Treaty does not constitute an au-
tonomous system of collective security. On the other hand, the Organ
of Consultation had met, sometimes very effectively indeed, in applica-
tion of the Treaty, without adopting any of the measures provided for
in article 8. Furthermore, the Rio Treaty, and the OAS, had been po-
litically useful in certain situations or disputes whenever one or both
sides wanted to back down while saving face."
2. States in favor of concurrent jurisdiction within the framework of
Resolution 502
Two members of the OAS, Chile 6 and Trinidad and Tobago," ac-
cepted the "concurrent" jurisdiction of the OAS and the Security
Council, but strictly within the framework of Security Council resolu-
tion 502. The Delegate of Trinidad and Tobago indicated that his
country holds the United Nations to be preeminent in establishing and
maintaining the rule of international lawY8 Professor Gordon Connell-
Smith has stated that "during the debate, Mexico and Colombia had
joined with the United States in arguing that the proper forum for ac-
tion on the dispute was the United Nations within the framework of
Resolution 502, reference to which was made in the preamble of the
OAS resolution."9
Regarding the United States, Professor Connell-Smith's assessment
matic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations, partial
or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed
force." Rio Treaty, supra note 10, art 8.
94. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doe. 33/82 23 (1982).
95. Had the Argentine Military Government been willing to use the occasion to
back down and accept the proposals made by Secretary of State Haig or by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, or indeed any other proposal, the Rio Treaty
would have served a useful purpose. John Drier pointed out that "a scrupulous regard
for the sensibilities of sovereignty, the niceties of protocol, and the importance of face-
saving formulas characterize most of the handling of inter-Latin American disputes by
the OAS." Drier, supra note 28, at 32.
96. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doe. 33/82 rev. 22 1 (1982).
97. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doe. 27/82 rev. 5-7 1 (1982).
98. Id. at 6.
99. Connell-Smith, supra note 82, at 345.
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is inaccurate. While it is clear that the United States in principle advo-
cated a solution to the conflict within the framework of Resolution 502
of the Security Council, the United States Delegation to the OAS
never made any reference to the United Nations as the proper fo-
rum.100 On the contrary, the United States seemed to be very careful to
avoid raising the question of OAS jurisdiction vis-A-vis the United Na-
tions.' 0' The United States explanation for its abstention at the convo-
cation of the Meeting of Consultation and at the adoption of the resolu-
tion was that Secretary of State Alexander Haig was still attempting to
assist the parties to settle their dispute peacefully. The United States
Delegation never said that it abstained because of jurisdiction. 102
3. States that accepted the jurisdiction of the OAS but argued, in
addition, in favor of 'freedom of choice" of forum
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Mexico, while accepting OAS competence,
also argued in favor of freedom of American states to choose to bring a
regional dispute or situation to either the United Nations or the
OAS. 0 3 The Delegate of Nicaragua, for example, indicated that on
March 25, 1982, his government had complained to the United Nations
Security Council of threats of use of force and of aggression against
Nicaragua by the United States. He made it very clear that, in his
government's opinion, members of the United Nations that are also
members of a regional organization have two choices before them in a
100. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the General Committee, OAS Doc. OEA/
ser. F./II.20 doc. 67/82 34 (1982). In fact, it was not until May 27 that the United
States position was formally stated within the OAS in a speech delivered by Secretary
of State Haig, indicating that "Resolution 502 embodies the principles which must
govern our [the Meeting of Consultation] search for peace." Id.
101. One could only speculate that the United States position intended to: a) be
consistent with views held by the United States in the Guatemala case (1954); the
Cuban case (1960-61 and 1962); the Haitian and Panamanian cases (1963 and 1964),
and the Dominican Republic case (1965), and b) neutralize the efforts that Nicaragua
was making at that time to bring future complaints against the United States directly
to the Security Council. In fact, on March 25, 1982, the Security Council heard a
statement made by the "Coordinator of the Board of Government of National Recon-
struction of Nicaragua" alleging "aggressive activities" carried out against his Govern-
ment by the United States Administration. 37 U.N. SCOR (2336th mtg.) at 47-48,
U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2336 (1982).
102. Thus, after the resolution was approved, the United States Delegate gave the
following explanation:
Thank you, Mr. President. I think the United States explained its position on
why we abstained. The essence of it was that Secretary Haig's mission was still
in a delicate stage, and we want that to be continued.
OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doc. 33/82 17 (1982).
103. Mexico, nonetheless, considered that in the Malvinas case, the Security Coun-
cil should be the proper forum. Id. at 15.
[VOL. 4:25
OAS DISPUTES AT THE U.N.S.C.
regional situation or dispute. They can use "the collective security of
the global organization or they can resort to the collective system
within the regional arrangement. 10 4 This view is not necessarily incon-
sistent or incompatible with the views of the countries that accepted
"concurrent" jurisdiction in the Malvinas case, within the confines of
Resolution 502.
The Delegate of Mexico did not actually deny the competence of the
OAS in the conflict. He reasoned that the United Nations and the
OAS are not parallel organizations, but that the OAS is clearly
subordinate to the United Nations. The Mexican Representative con-
cluded that no American state should be deprived of the right to take
any matter affecting its vital interests to the Security Council whenever
it considers it necessary.10 5
4. Implied acceptance by several states of unqualified OAS
jurisdiction
The remaining OAS members that participated in the Organ of Con-
sultation seemed to have accepted the competence of the OAS with
apparent disregard for the fact that the Security Council was already
seized of the question. The Meeting of Consultation resumed its consid-
eration of the conflict on May 27, 1982. By then Secretary of State
Alexander Haig had terminated his peace effort and the United States
had decided, during the intervening period, to officially support Great
Britain. Except for the addition of Resolution II, adopted on May 29,
1982, which involved an action by a regional arrangement that in cer-
tain respects is inconsistent with the decisions of the Security Council,
this case added nothing new from the jurisdictional standpoint. 108
c. Jurisdiction and Action of the OAS in the Malvinas Conflict: An
Appraisal
As previously pointed out, it is commonly accepted that under cer-
tain circumstances, regional organizations may exercise concurrent ju-
risdiction. At least where the United Nations takes no concrete action
to either ban or terminate regional jurisdiction in a specific situation,
concurrent jurisdiction occurs.'0 7 The Security Council seems to have
104. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doe. 24/82 13 (1982).
105. Id. at 21.
106. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./Il.20 doe. 24/82 rev. 3 corr. 1 1 (1982). This resolu-
tion involved an action by a regional arrangement that in certain aspects is inconsistent
with the decision of the Security Council. Id.
107. Moore: The Role of Regional Arrangements, supra note 45, at 148; Garcia-
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the power to revoke or terminate regional jurisdiction under the provi-
sions of articles 24, 25, 39, 51, 52, and 53 of the United Nations
Charter.
Convocation of the OAS Meeting of Consultation to consider the
Malvinas conflict was unprecedented as a case of "concurrent" jurisdic-
tion in one particular respect. In previous cases the United Nations and
the OAS shared jurisdiction, either because the United Nations itself
deferred the question to the OAS, 0 8 or because the United Nations
considered a situation after the OAS originally dealt with it. 0 D The
OAS has never unilaterally decided to assume jurisdiction after the Se-
curity Council had taken action and, as in the Malvinas case, remained
seized of the matter.
This case was significant in several other respects with regard to the
issue of the jurisdiction or competence of the OAS. First, by the time
of the convocation of the Meeting of Consultation, the Security Council
had already adopted Resolution 502, demanding immediate cessation
of hostilities, withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands, and
calling on the governments of both parties to seek a diplomatic solution
to their differences. Second, one of the parties in the conflict was a
major Western power that was not a member of the OAS, a fact that a
priori creates a serious obstacle to the effective use of a regional forum.
Thus, in the absence of a nonmember's consent, as with the Malvinas
conflict, the natural forum seems to be, ab initio and exclusively, the
United Nations. Third, the OAS machinery can indeed be useful in
certain circumstances even after the United Nations has been seized of
a question. For example, the machinery has been used according to the
imperatives of East-West competition, i.e., in situations involving "non-
Western" powers on one side and the major OAS partner on the other.
It provides legitimacy to measures that would otherwise require justifi-
cation under United Nations Charter, article 51, as in the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis.110
Amador, supra note 80, at 3; see RELATIONS IN PEACE AND SECURITY, supra note 78,
at 71 (noting Ana Levin's views concerning concurrent jurisdiction).
108. For instance the Cuban case, first phase (1960), and the Haitian and Panama-
nian cases (1963 and 1964) respectively.
109. For instance the Cuban missile crisis (1962) and the Dominican Republic case
(1965).
110. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMMONDS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 359 (1969). Of course, one can make a case for
anticipatory self-defense under general international law and also under article 51 of
the Charter, for the United States' quarantine of October 1962. Id. Professor Louis
Henkin, however, pointed out that:
[T]he United States government itself refrained from claiming justification
under Article 51. United States authorities apparently recognized that to invoke
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The Rio Treaty calls for hemispheric military assistance in the event
of any armed attack within the region described in article 4. Discussion
of jurisdiction therefore mainly focused on whether that Treaty applied
to the crisis in the South Atlantic." 1 The Meeting of Consultation con-
demned the "unjustified and disproportionate" aggression by Great
Britain against Argentina.-"2
As Security Council Resolution 502 clearly and conclusively sug-
gested, it is doubtful whether the first use of force by Argentina, re-
gardless of the fundamental question of sovereignty, could be regarded
as legitimate under any of the prevailing rules and standards of inter-
national law. Consequently, as long as British action remained within
the terms of Resolution 502, and being, as it was, an action that had
not prejudged ultimate sovereignty over the islands, the application of
the Rio Treaty was indeed very doubtful or at least undesirable. Had
British action exceeded Resolution 502, applicability of the Rio Treaty,
i.e., the question of OAS competence, would have no longer been le-
gally questionable.
Without arguing against OAS competence, Professor John Norton
Moore suggested that:
[T]he OAS might have sought to reinforce the peace initiatives of the United
States or to recommend that both parties accept international arbitration or ju-
risdiction of a Special Chamber of the International Court of Justice as Canada
and the United States have done in the Gulf of Maine dispute. At minimum, the
Organization could have endorsed Security Council Resolution 502 calling for an
immediate Argentine withdrawal, a cease-fire and negotiations by all parties .'
This statement essentially reflects the author's view, but merits one im-
portant qualification. The order of priority that Professor Moore uses to
justify OAS action in this particular case is inadequate and, to a cer-
that article required reading it as permitting any force in "anticipatory self-de-
fense"; any nation could then justify any aggression on the pretext of "anticipa-
tory self-defense". . . . Indeed, to justify our action in Cuba on the basis of
article 51 is to read that article as permitting force in circumstances which would
not have been deemed 'self-defense' even in the days long before the Charter
outlawed force.
57th Annual Meeting of the ASIL- Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contempo-
rary International Law, in 1963 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL 147, 151-52. See,
Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies with Special Reference to the
Organization of American States, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 197-203 (1967) (offer-
ing an extended discussion of the same topic).
111. Chile, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, and, less forcefully,
Mexico argued that the Rio Treaty did not apply. These countries, however, did not
invoke similar reasoning.
112. See Resolution II, supra note 15, para. I (noting the opinion of the Meeting
of Consultation).
113. Moore: Falklands War, supra note 89, at 830-31.
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tain degree, dangerous.
The first and most compelling issue before the OAS, from the point
of view of justifying its jurisdiction, was, under the circumstances, to
act in absolute conformity with the decision of the Security Council.
This meant supporting Resolution 502 in its entirety. The argument
that the OAS action could have been justified by virtue of having rein-
forced the peace initiatives of the United States alone, or that it could
have recommended "that both parties accept international arbitration.
) may, at best, have some practical validity. From a legal stand-
point, however, the argument is ludicrous." 4 If the Security Council
takes a clear and unequivocal decision'" in a situation that falls under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the justification for paral-
lel action by a regional arrangement should not be based on unilateral
initiatives of single member states which, not infrequently, have their
own vested interests in the outcome of the conflict."' 6
3. The situation of Grenada (1983)1"
This Article will not discuss several aspects of legal significance of
114. There is, in addition, a factual error in Professor Moore's argument. On May
29, 1982, when the Meeting of Consultation adopted Resolution II, the United States
was no longer engaged in any "peace initiative." Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the reso-
lution states that:
[T]o express its conviction that it is essential to reach with the greatest urgency a
peaceful and honorable settlement of the conflict, under the auspices of the
United Nations, and in that connection, to recognize the praiseworthy efforts and
good offices of Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Secretary General of the United
Nations, and to lend its full support to the task entrusted to him by the Security
Council.
Resolution II, supra note 15, at para. 4. Professor Moore then states that the OAS had
"also urged the United States 'to refrain' from materially aiding Britain in deference to
the principle of 'hemispheric solidarity'." Moore: Falklands War, supra note 85, at
831. Curiously enough, however, no mention is made in Professor Moore's editorial
comment of the fact that the resolution also "urged the government of the United
States of America to order the immediate lifting of the coercive measures" applied
against Argentina. Id.
115. All members of the United Nations are obligated "to accept and carry out"
the decisions of the Security Council, in accordance with article 25 of the United Na-
tions Charter.
116. America's Falklands War, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 1984, at 29; Pincus,
British Got Crucial Data in Falklands, Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1984, at 1.
117. See generally UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GRENADA: A PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT 1 (Dec. 16, 1983) (discussing the Grenada crisis); Massing, Grenada
Before and After, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 1984, at 76 (same); Naipal, An Island Be-
trayed, HARPER'S, Mar. 1984, at 61 (same); KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES,
GRENADA, MILITARY COUP-INTERVENTION BY U.S. AND CARIBBEAN FORCES, 120
(1984) (giving an overview of this subject); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GRENADA I (Jan. 1984) (discussing the international law implications of the Grenada
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the invasion of Grenada, such as the fundamental question of peaceful
settlement of disputes and the use of force, as they do not directly re-
late to the issue of competence. This case is significant from the stand-
point of the competence of the OAS vis-A-vis the competence of the
United Nations only in that it constituted an intraregional or "local"
situation which the OAS has chosen not to address.
The OAS became acquainted with the crisis at a special session of its
Permanent Council held on October 26, 1983. At that meeting, some
individual member States criticized, ineffectually, the invasion. Neither
the Council nor any other OAS body, however, made any specific as-
sertion of jurisdiction regarding the situation in Grenada."'
Notwithstanding the fact that the invasion constituted an obvious
breach of the peace within the region described in article 4 of the Rio
Treaty, Meeting of Consultation was not convoked to examine this situ-
ation, as would be appropriate under articles 3 or 6 of the same treaty.
This inaction of the OAS was particularly surprising because during
the meeting of the Permanent Council, the majority of the delegations
accused the United States, and the other Caribbean states involved in
the invasion, of committing an illegal act of armed intervention con-
trary to both the United Nations and the OAS Charters.' In fact, in
addition to article 8, paragraph 4 of the OECS Treaty, articles 22 and
28 of the OAS Charter were invoked as the legal basis for the invasion.
Furthermore, some of the OAS members that participated in the inva-
sion of Grenada, have in similar situations in the past, strongly favored
invasion); Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double Standard at the United
Nations?, 78 AMi J. INT'L L. 811, 811 (1984) (discussing the alleged "double standard"
in United Nations treatment of aggression of Western nations and socialist countries);
Goldman, Some International Law Questions Posed by the United States Invasion of
Grenada 1 [on file at ASIL] (discussing the international law implications of the inva-
sion); Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada, Reflections on the Laulness of
the Invasion, 78 AM. J. Ir'L L. 131, 131 (1984) (examining the law governing such
situations and making recommendations for future legal reflection); Moore, Grenada
and the International Double Standard, 78 Ai. J. INTL' L. 145, 153-59 (1984) (dis-
cussing the politicization of the rule of law in the context of the debate over the inva-
sion of Grenada); Thornbide, The Grenada Crisis, THE WORLD TODAY, Dec. 1983, at
468 (discussing the invasion); Vagts, International Law Under Time Pressure: Grading
the Grenada Take-Home Examination, 78 At.i. J. INT'L L. 169, 172 (1984) (discussing
the Grenada situation); Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada-
Impact on World Order, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 395, 395-401 (1984) (same); Boyle,
Chayes, Dore, Falk, Feinrider, Ferguson, Fine, Nunes & Weston, International Law-
lessness in Grenada, 78 Ami. J. INT'L L. 172, 172 (1984) (deploring the invasion as a
violent intervention into the affairs of another country).
118. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. G./CP./ACTA doc. 543/83 2 (1983).
119. See id. (noting the statements made during that session, among others, by the
Representatives of Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, Bahamas, the Domin-
ican Republic, Venezuela, Brazil, Honduras, Chile, Uruguay, and Nicaragua).
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the competence of the OAS, disregarding rules clearly established, in-
ter alia, in articles 24, 34, 35 and 103 of the United Nations Charter.
The United Nations General Assembly, on the other hand, adopted a
resolution in November 1983 that deeply regretted the use of force as a
solution to the problem of Grenada. 120 Thus, the OAS was bypassed
when, as a matter of law, OAS competence seems clearer in the Gre-
nada case than in the Malvinas case. Grenada involved an action by
members of the OAS.
4. The Nicaraguan case (1983)
As early as March 25, 1982,121 the government of Nicaragua com-
plained to the Security Council of aggressive activities carried out by
the United States Administration against the Sandinista revolution and
the government of Nicaragua. On March 23, 1983, the Security Coun-
cil met to consider a Nicaraguan complaint of "a grave increase of acts
of aggression against Nicaragua and the Sandinista People's Revolu-
tion." The Nicaraguan government claimed that a situation existed
that endangered international peace. 122 Referring to the formulation of
the complaint, the representative of the United Kingdom commented:
I assume that, by definition, the Council is not being asked to consider the inter-
nal affairs of Nicaragua. The "Sandinista People's Revolution" is an internal
matter for the people of Nicaragua. The essence of the complaint, therefore, is
aggression against Nicaragua.123
Between March 23 and March 29, 1983, the Security Council held
eight meetings to consider the complaint of Nicaragua. The Security
Council did not make a decision, but remained seized of the situation.
At the end of its 2427th meeting, however, the President of the Council
for the month of March, Sir John Thomson, speaking as the Represen-
tative of the United Kingdom, suggested that the Security Council
should "assist in bringing ... a dialogue into being, and that the good
offices of the Secretary General could be an effective means toward
that end .. .124
In Washington the following day, the Representative of Honduras to
120. See G.A. Res. 38/7, 38 U.N. GAOR (43d plen. mtg.) at 19-20, U.N. Doc.
A/38/47 (1983) (concerning the situation in Grenada and the action of the United
Nations Secretary General immediately after the General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 38/7).
121. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. F./II.20 doc. 24/82 rev. 3 corr. 1 1 (1982).
122. Letter Dated 22 March 1983 from the Representative of Nicaragua Ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/15651 (1983).
123. 38 U.N. SCOR (2427th mtg.) at 37, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2427 (1983).
124. Id. at 42.
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the OAS requested a meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS to
discuss a proposal made a few days earlier within the Permanent Coun-
cil by the Foreign Minister of Honduras. The proposal urged the Cen-
tral American nations, especially Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua, to initiate at the earliest possible date, a
process of overall and regional negotiations, to reach responsible, seri-
ous and lasting agreements to restore the peace and security of Central
America."12 When the OAS Permanent Council met on April 5, 1983,
Honduras submitted a draft resolution essentially based on this propo-
sal. The Representative of Nicaragua, without rejecting the possibility
of a dialogue within the OAS, indicated that Nicaragua had already
submitted a complaint to the Security Council and that, consequently,
the question was now under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. He
also mentioned that the consideration of this question was still open at
the United Nations. The Nicaraguan Representative reiterated the po-
sition of Nicaragua in favor of the freedom of OAS members to choose,
in situations of this nature, either the United Nations or the OAS as
forum . 26
The Nicaraguan Representative then suggested that any attempt to
find a solution for the Central American crisis through the Honduran
proposal would be a "waste of time." He maintained that the principal
cause of the situation was United States policy, and implied that the
Honduran proposal was, in fact, a United States stratagem designed to
place Nicaragua in a disadvantageous negotiating position vis-A-vis
four Central American states strongly influenced and dominated by the
United States.
To reinforce his argument in favor of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United Nations, the Representative of Nicaragua asserted that a meet-
ing of the Central American nations would be pointless because Nica-
ragua was on good terms with Guatemala. He claimed that whatever
problems existed with Costa Rica at the time were in the process of
bilateral resolution. With regard to El Salvador, he said, there were
only unfounded accusations by the United States government. The Nic-
araguan Representative admitted that at the time, his country's major
difficulty was with Honduras, though not with Honduras per se. The
problems, he claimed, existed only insofar as that government had
given in to United States pressure and had allowed bands of irregulars
125. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. G./CP. doe. 1354/83 1 (1983). The use of the adverb
"especially" in that context is rather curious. Since Belize is not a member of the OAS,
there are no other nations in Central America to which the letter could have referred.
126. Minutes of the special meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS, April 5,
1983, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. G./ CP./ACTA doe. 520/83 24-28 (1983).
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trained, financed and supervised by the United States solely in order to
"destabilize" the Sandinista government, to use Honduran territory.
The Permanent Council of the OAS took no action on April 5. It
met again on April 11 to continue discussing the jurisdictional question
and eventually the Honduran proposal. Colombia, however, one of the
members of the Contadora Group, 2 7 requested a deferral until a later
date. In the course of the discussion some countries voiced concern over
the jurisdictional question, particularly because the Security Council
had already begun considering the Nicaraguan complaint which ap-
peared to be closely connected with the proposal made by Honduras at
the OAS.
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, in a letter addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council on April 6, 1983, France gave its support
to the proposal made in the Security Council by the representative of
the United Kingdom that the Secretary General should, with his con-
sent, be entrusted with a mission of good offices in Central America.' 28
Two days later the United States Representative presented the position
of her Government in a letter. The letter stated that the OAS had al-
ready been seized of the problem in Nicaragua. In accordance with
United Nations Charter, article 52, regional problems are best solved
at the regional level. The United States therefore supported the re-
gional efforts already underway, including those in the OAS, to address
the issue.12 9 The same day, El Salvador submitted a letter to the Secur-
ity Council supporting the call for "a regional dialogue with no exclu-
sions." The Salvadoran letter also suggested that:
Inasmuch as there now exists a concrete initiative to that end in the form of a
draft resolution submitted to the Permanent Council of the Organization of
American States (OAS), which is the appropriate regional forum, my govern-
ment supports that initiative as a serious and viable effort for the cause of peace
127. Four countries formed the group: Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama.
The group was named after an island off Panama's Pacific coast where their peace
initiative was launched in January 1983. Support to this group was subsequently given
by resolution 530 of the Security Council in Resolution 38/10 of the United Nations
General Assembly, as well as Resolution AG/RES. 675 (XIII/0/83) of the General
Assembly, of the OAS. On October 1984 the Contadora Group, with the consent of
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, adopted the Act of
Contadora for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, OAS Doc. OEA/ser. G./
CP./INF. 2222 1 (1984).
128. Letter Dated 6 April 1983 from the Permanent Representative of France to
the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council at I, U.N. Doc.
S/15689 (1983).
129. Letter Dated 8 April 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, at 1 U.N. Doc. S/15694 (1983).
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in the Central American region.'30
The Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations, in
a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council pointed out
that:
Both Nicaragua and Honduras had a regional and continental commitment, as
members of the Organization of American States, whose Charter clearly stated
that disputes between member countries should be submitted to the procedures
provided for in the Charter before they could be taken to the United Nations
Security Council.1 3 1
The views expressed in the United States and in the Salvadoran let-
ters asserted that the OAS had already agreed to deal with the Hondu-
ran proposal. As stated, however, the OAS did not reach a decision
either with regard to the jurisdictional question or with regard to the
Honduras proposal. Interestingly, during the proceedings before the In-
ternational Court of Justice in the Nicaraguan case the United States
agents, in referring to the primary responsibility of the Security Coun-
cil for the maintenance of peace and security, contended that article
24, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter takes into account not
only the General Assembly of the United Nations, but also the role of
regional arrangements or agencies as recognized in article 52 of the
Charter.'32 The United States also argued that the Contadora Process,
endorsed in the United Nations and in the OAS as the accepted mech-
anism for addressing the conflict in Central America, constituted a re-
gional arrangement under article 52 of the Charter. 3
Since 1983, the OAS General Assembly, the United Nations Secur-
ity Council, and the United Nations General Assembly have, on several
occasions, supported and endorsed the work of the Contadora Process
and that of its Support Group.3 These endorsements, however, should
130. Letter Dated 8 April 1983 from the Permanent Representative of El Salvador
to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council at I, U.N.
Doc. S/15691 (1983).
131. Letter Dated I1 April 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Honduras
to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/15700 (1983).
132. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, (Nicar. v. US.) 1984
I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 188, para. 6 (Aug. 17, 1988). Concerning the allocation of residual
responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, it should be
observed it is not certain that article 24, paragraph 1 "takes into account" regional
arrangements or agencies. Id.
133. Id. at 190, 234.
134. See, e.g., OAS G.A. Res. AG/RES. 675 (XIII/0/83). OAS Doc. OEA/ser.
P./XIII.0.2 vol. 1 84, 85 (1983) (reaffirming support for the Contadora Group); AG/
RES. 702 (XIV/0/84), OAS Doc. OEA/ser. P./XIV.0.2 vol. 1 (1985) (urging the
Contadora Group to persevere in reaching an agreement for peace and cooperation);
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not be construed as an implied recognition that the OAS was seized of
the question. Moreover, the reference to article 52 of the United Na-
tions Charter appears to ignore, in limine, the distinction between a
dispute and an action covered under Chapter VII of the United Na-
tions Charter which is the subject of the complaint of Nicaragua.135
The Salvadoran position categorically concluded that the OAS is the
proper forum. The majority of OAS members, however, do not now
readily accept this view. Nor does the Office of the Legal Counsel of
the OAS General Secretariat support the Salvadoran view. In a recent
legal opinion on the subject, that office stated:
At present the sovereign right of each State to choose the forum it considers
suitable to take cognizance of an international dispute or of a situation that may
endanger international peace and security is recognized; that is to say, primacy
has been given to the rule contained in article 35 of the Charter of the United
Nations, as a recognition of its regulatory hierarchy and in order not to subject
the States, a priori, to a certain procedure ....
In conclusion, we consider that at present, the thesis in favor of free selection of
the forum prevails. 3 '
The ICJ addressed the question of the competence of the Security
Council and of regional arrangements in extenso, in Nicaragua v.
United States.137 The issue was raised as the result of an objection of
the United States to the effect that the existence of a global and re-
gional negotiation process, namely the United Nations Security Coun-
cil and the Contadora Group, constituted an obstacle to the admissibil-
ity of the Nicaraguan application. The United States contended that:
[G]iven the commitment of both Nicaragua and the United States to the Con-
tadora Process, the endorsement of that process by the competent political organs
of the United Nations and the [OAS], and the comprehensive, integrated nature
of that process itself, the Court should refrain from adjudicating the merits of
AG/RES. 770 (XV/0/85), OAS Doc. OEA/ser. P./XV.0.2 vol. 1 27, 27 (1985)
(same); AG/RES. 831 (XVI/0/86), OAS Doc. OEA/ser. P./XVI.0.2 vol. 1 59, 59
(1986) (recognizing the laudable efforts of the Contadora Group and the Support
Group to achieve peace in Central America); see also 38 U.N. SCOR Res. 530 (1983)
(regarding the United Nations organs); see also 40 U.N. SCOR Res. 562 (1985) (reaf-
firming its support to the Contadora Group and urging it to intensify its efforts); OAS
G.A. Res. AG/RES. 810 (XIII/0/1983), OAS Doc. OEA/ser. P./XIII.0.2 vol. 1
(1983) (same); A.G. Res. 871 (XVI/0/87), OAS Doc. OEA/ser. P./XVI.0.2 vol. 2
(1987) (same).
135. See E.J. DE ARECHAGA, supra note 19, at 362 (noting the broad scope of
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter).
136. OAS Doc. OEA/ser. G./CP. doc.1354/83 4 (1983).
137. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 215, 215 (Order of October 4).
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the Nicaraguan allegations and that it should hold the Nicaraguan application of
9 April to be inadmissible.""
The ICJ considered that the existence of active negotiations such as
the Contadora Process that involved both parties should not prevent the
Security Council and the Court from exercising their separate func-
tions under the Charter. The Court added that all arrangements that
the parties to this case may have made regarding the settlement of dis-
putes or ICJ jurisdiction are subject to the United Nations Charter,
article 103.139
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the disputes that have given rise to conflicts of compe-
tence between the OAS and the United Nations clearly indicates that
such conflicts arise only if an OAS member party to a dispute tries to
bypass the regional forum and take the case directly to the United Na-
tions Security Council, when other member states prefer to deal with
the same dispute or situation at the regional level. Obviously, if all in-
terested parties to a "local" dispute agree that the United Nations or
any other forum or procedure that they find acceptable should deal
with a question, then no possibility of a jurisdictional conflict exists.
Members of the international community involved in a serious inter-
national dispute have an obligation under the United Nations Charter
to endeavor to seek a solution to the dispute by themselves, as provided
in article 33 of the Charter. If the dispute persists, the parties, or other
United Nations members, can bring it before the Security Council pur-
suant to article 35, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter. Thus, a
member of the United Nations, even if not directly involved, may bring
a dispute or situation of the nature described in article 34, to the atten-
tion of the Security Council or the General Assembly. The United Na-
tions Secretary General also may call to the attention of the Security
Council any matter which in his/her opinion may threaten the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. In addition, it is important to
note once again that the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Na-
tions Charter regarding "action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" are not limited in any
way by the provisions that regulate the action and functioning of re-
gional arrangements under Chapter VIII.
138. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984
I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 237 (Aug. 17, 1984).
139. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 215, 440 (Order of October 4).
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Although article 23 of the OAS Charter provides that disputes that
may arise between members of the OAS "shall be submitted" to the
procedures set forth in the same Charter,140 neither that provision nor
any other of a similar scope should preempt the right of the members
of regional arrangements to choose the Security Council or the United
Nations General Assembly, if they believe that regional procedures will
not provide a fair or balanced consideration of the dispute in question,
and consequently will not serve their interests. Moreover, if those mem-
bers of the United Nations that are not members of the OAS may
bring any dispute or situation, "the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," to the
attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly, it would not
be reasonable to assume that in a local dispute or situation to which
only OAS members are parties, they should have, in that case, fewer
rights than states that are not members of the OAS.
If, for example, an Asian or European state could conceivably bring
to the attention of the United Nations organs a controversy involving
only members of the OAS, it would be fundamentally unfair in that
case to assume that a member of the OAS should not enjoy the same
right, notwithstanding the provision of article 23 of the OAS Charter.
Furthermore, as Judge Ruda has observed, "it is even less conceivable
that [a member of the OAS] should be unable to exercise the rights
which it enjoys as a member of the United Nations."1 4' To accept the
proposition that an OAS member cannot have direct access to the
United Nations political organs in a case of a "local" dispute without
previously submitting such dispute to regional procedures would, in
short, be tantamount to admitting that members of the OAS are, with
regard to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, at a disad-
vantage and therefore in a position of inferiority vis-A-vis other United
Nations member states that are not members of that regional
arrangement.
To recapitulate, the members of the United Nations that are also
members of regional arrangements such as the OAS are, according to
article 52, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, obligated to
"make every effort" to achieve a peaceful settlement of local disputes
through regional procedures before referring them to the United Na-
140. See OAS CHARTER art. 24 (requiring direct negotiation, good offices, media-
tion, investigation, and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those which
the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time).
141. Ruda, Relaciones de la O.E.A. y la O.N.U. en cuanto al mantenimiento de la
paz y la seguridad internacionales, 1961 REVISTA JURIDICA DE BUENOS AIRES I-I 15,
39.
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tions Security Council. Nevertheless, submission of a dispute or situa-
tion to the OAS is not a precondition to submission of the same dispute
or situation to the Security Council. The OAS members that are par-
ties to a local dispute, therefore, are under no obligation "first of all,"
that is to say before submitting the dispute to the consideration of the
Security Council, to try to settle the dispute through the methods indi-
cated in article 33, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter which,
of course, includes as one of the methods "resort to regional agencies or
arrangements." As Professor Jimenez de Arechaga pointed out:
[Lies dispositions d'un accord regional ne peuvent 8tre invoquees pour interdire
aux pays associ6s d'avoir acces direct i la juridiction des Nations-Unies, non plus
que pour les soustraire, ffit-ce temporairemcnt, d l'action protectrice des organes
de cette communaut6 universelle.
12
Legally this conclusion is supported, inter alia, by article 52, para-
graph 4 of the United Nations Charter, which qualifies the role of re-
gional arrangements by stating that "this [a]rticle in no way impairs
the application of articles 34 and 35, ' '14S and by article 103, which pro-
vides that "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail." The conclusion is further sup-
ported by the OAS Charter itself which, in its article 137, states
that "none of the provisions of this Charter shall be construed as im-
pairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under the
Charter of the United Nations."14
Finally, the same conclusion is reinforced by the current practice of
the organs of the United Nations and of the OAS, and by the opinion
of the majority of the members of the OAS as well. To be sure, the
Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly are not
strictly organs of first instance. They are neither replacements for
traditional procedures for peaceful settlement of international disputes,
nor are they substitutes for regional arrangements. They were estab-
lished to "step in" when the traditional procedures mentioned in article
33 of the United Nations Charter or when regional arrangements are
142. La Coordinacion Des Systemes De L'ONU et de L'Organisation Des Etats
Americaisns Pour le Reglament Pacifique des Differends et la Securite Collective, in 1
REcuEIL WDES COURS 111, 426 (1964).
143. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting a similar provision has re-
cently been included in the Protocol of Amendments to the OAS Charter, called the
"Protocol of Cartagena de Indias").
144. Article 10 of the Rio Treaty has a similar provision with regard to the applica-
tion of that treaty. Rio Treaty, supra note 10, art. 10.
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ineffective or inadequate. The Charter insists, first of all, upon volun-
tary action by the parties to a dispute. Because of this, traditional
methods receive priority. The Security Council and the General Assem-
bly exist to deal with a dispute when other procedures have failed or
when a member state is dissatisfied with the handling of a case at the
regional level.145
Beyond that, and apart from the inconsistencies of some legal provi-
sions analyzed above, the majority of cases reviewed within this Article
- those of Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Grenada,
as well as the present situation in Central America - conclusively
demonstrate that the underlying reasons for the conflicts between the
OAS and the United Nations are to be found in the political configura-
tion of the OAS membership and in the imperatives of the East-West
competition rather than in the ambiguities of any international
instrument.
As the Secretary General of the United Nations recently pointed out
with regard to the crisis in Central America:
The situation in Central America has steadily deteriorated with the increasing
intrusion of conflicting ideologies, the attempts to impose unilateral solutions to
the problems of the region and the resort to force . . . . I believe that only by
insulating the Central American situation from the East-West conflict and seek-
ing a Latin American solution that takes account of the economic and social
needs of the area can a genuine settlement be achieved. 4"
On January 20, 1987, the President of Honduras expressed a similar
view with regard to the Central American crisis. He recognized that
the international factor that exacerbates the crisis in that region is the
East-West confrontation. Nevertheless, he said that every possible ef-
fort must be made to extricate Central America from that confronta-
tion. 4" Thus, the strictly legal issue concerning United Nations author-
ity versus OAS authority with reference to this, as well as other
matters, has been subordinated to more pressing political interests. In
other words, the jurisdictional conflicts between the universal and the
regional organizations are, as Professor Bowett put it, "politically
motivated."
145. It should be observed, however, that for the settlement of strictly legal issues
the ICJ, and not the Security Council, is normally the most appropriate forum.
146. 41 U.N. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE OR-
GANIZATION 7 (1986), U.N. Doc. DPI/897-41114-Sept. 1986- 15M.
147. See OAS Doc. OEA/ser. G./CP./INF. doc. 2495/87 (1987) (containing the
letter of January 20, 1987, from the President of Honduras to the Presidents of the
member states of the Contadora Group and the Support Group on the occasion of the
visit to Honduras of their Foreign Ministers, accompanied by the Secretaries General
of the OAS and of the United Nations).
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With regard to its political configuration, contrary to other regional
agencies such as the OAU or the Arab League, the OAS is totally
asymmetrical, with a military and industrial superpower with global
responsibility on one side and a group of weak, mostly undeveloped,
states on the other. Thus, when the most powerful member of the OAS
was involved in a dispute or situation with a small state, as in the spe-
cific cases of Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the cur-
rent case of Nicaragua, the regional forum seemed inadequate. It is
clear from the analysis of these cases that the power differential within
the OAS membership worked to the disadvantage of the smaller coun-
tries once the OAS was chosen as a forum. In each of these situations
the threat of Communist ideology appears to have been the real justifi-
cation for advocating their exclusive consideration at the regional level
and consequently, the reason for preventing the United Nations from
dealing with matters that are clearly under its jurisdiction.
Viewed from a strictly factual standpoint, the ultimate reason ap-
pears to have been primarily the determination of the United States not
to jeopardize its position by subjecting those cases to the jurisdiction of
the Security Council. The United States action intended to maintain
control of regional situations within the United States sphere of
influence.
Even though from a formalistic vantage point the Guatemalan, the
Cuban, or the Nicaraguan situations, among others, could be charac-
terized as "local" or regional, some states of the OAS, in particular
those favoring the priority of the regional forum, perceive these situa-
tions as basically part of the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union
in the Western Hemisphere. That perception usually has the effect of
altering the local nature of the disputes or situations and transforming
them into disputes of an extracontinental dimension which, ab-initio,
should not be dealt with by the OAS but by the United Nations.
The United States and other OAS members effectively opposed the
Guatemalan and Cuban attempt to take their respective situations to
the United Nations. The outcome of the jurisdictional conflicts in the
Security Council with regard to these cases meant that, in actual prac-
tice, the United Nations relinquished substantial jurisdiction to the
OAS on matters under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
With regard to the position of the states that favor the autonomy of
the OAS as a forum for the consideration of regional disputes and situ-
ations, two other considerations should be added. First is the fact that,
by forcing the adoption of regional procedures that are unacceptable to
certain states involved in a dispute or situation, the possibility of satis-
factorily resolving such cases becomes less likely. Second is the perplex-
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ing lack of consistency shown by those same states in support of the
OAS as the "proper" forum.
The case of Grenada, for example, demonstrates that states respond
selectively to the choice of the regional forum, largely as a function of
self-serving objectives and of immediate political considerations. Had
Meeting of Consultation been convoked to consider this case, politically
it would have been very difficult for the majority of the OAS members
not to express their disapproval with regard to the action. In fact, eigh-
teen of those States voiced their strong opposition at a relatively incon-
sequential meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on October 26,
1987.
Needless to say, the OAS is, in many respects, better equipped than
the United Nations to find constructive and satisfactory solutions to
regional disputes. The OAS is an established regional agency composed
of states that have many historical, cultural and sociopolitical links and
a great deal of experience and tradition regarding the peaceful settle-
ment of intraregional disputes. But the OAS is useful and efficacious in
helping to resolve intraregional disputes only insofar as the ideological
confrontation between the East and West is not one of the factors that
actually gave rise to the dispute or situation.
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